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Abstract	
Systems	thinking	is	used	as	a	way	of	understanding	behaviours	and	actions	in	complex	healthcare	organisations.	An	
important	premise	of	the	concept	is	that	every	action	in	a	system	causes	a	reaction	elsewhere	in	that	system.	These	
reactions	can	lead	to	unintended	consequences,	sometimes	after	the	original	action,	and	are	therefore	not	always	attributed	
to	them.	This	article	applies	systems	thinking	to	a	medicines	management	case	study,	to	highlight	how	quality	improvement	
practitioners	can	use	the	approach	to	underpin	planning	and	implementation	of	patient	safety	initiatives.	The	case	study	is	
specific	to	transcribing	in	children’s	hospices,	but	the	strategies	can	be	applied	to	other	areas.	The	article	explains	that	while	
root	cause	analysis	tools	are	useful	for	identifying	the	cause	of,	and	possible	solutions	to,	problems,	they	need	to	be	
considered	carefully	in	terms	of	unintended	consequences,	and	how	the	system	into	which	the	solution	is	implemented	may	
be	affected	by	the	change.	Analysis	of	problems	using	a	systems-thinking	approach	can	help	practitioners	to	develop	robust	
and	well-informed	business	cases	to	present	to	decision	makers.		
medicines	management,	nursing	management,	patient	safety,	systems	thinking,	transcribing,	unintended	consequences,	
wicked	issues	
Introduction	
Patient	safety,	defined	as	‘avoiding	harm	to	patients	from	the	care	that	is	intended	to	help	them’,	is	an	essential	
component	of	quality	in	health	care	(Institute	of	Medicine	(IOM)	2001)	(Figure	1).		
Prevention	of	medicines	management	errors,	defined	by	the	European	Medicines	Agency	(EMA)	(2015)	as	‘an	
unintended	failure	in	the	drug	treatment	process	that	leads	to,	or	has	the	potential	to	lead	to,	harm	to	the	patient’,	is	a	
vital	part	of	ensuring	patient	safety.	Failures	resulting	in	medicines	management	errors,	for	example	during	
prescribing	or	administration,	are	caused	mainly	by	human	factors	(Department	of	Health	(DH)	2000),	and	can	have	
significant	human,	organisational,	and	financial	costs	(Frontier	Economics	2014).		
Medicines	management	errors	are	the	most	common	preventable	sources	of	adverse	incidents	(EMA	2015),	with	
one	in	ten	episodes	of	medication	administration,	in	England	and	Wales,	resulting	in	an	error	(National	Patient	Safety	
Agency	2007).	As	well	as	being	harmful	to	patients,	these	errors	can	be	stressful	for	the	administering	person	(Fisher	
and	Scott	2013).	Although	it	is	not	possible	to	eradicate	errors	totally,	the	consequences	can	be	minimised	by	systems	
that	tolerate	inevitable	human	errors,	and	contain	their	effects	(DH	2000).	
This	article	uses	a	case	study	to	critically	explore,	and	demonstrate	learning	from,	a	patient	safety	incident	related	
to	medicines	management.	
Figure	1.	Six	dimensions	of	quality		
(Institute	of	Medicine	2001)		
Case	study	
The	practice	setting	is	a	children’s	hospice,	where	children	with	life-limiting	conditions	are	cared	for.	Children’s	hospices	
function	differently	to	adult	hospices,	in	that	their	primary	provision	is	respite	or	short-break	care.	In	this	hospice,	planned	
admissions	for	short-break	care	are	on	Mondays	and	Fridays,	and	children	are	accompanied	by	their	parents/carers	
throughout	the	admission	process,	which	can	take	up	to	two	hours.	These	are	busy	days,	as	the	admissions	and	discharges	
often	take	place	in	close	proximity,	both	in	time	and	space.		
Admissions	include	transcription	of	medications,	routinely	taken	by	the	children,	onto	the	hospice’s	drug	charts.	Most	
children	have	complex	drug	regimens,	which	requires	a	registered	nurse	(RN)	to	take	time	and	concentrate	to	ensure	the	
transcription	is	accurate.	Completed	transcriptions	are	checked	by	another	RN,	who	is	usually	admitting	a	different	patient	
at	the	same	time,	and	there	are	additional	time	pressures	on	staff,	for	example	if	parents/carers	need	to	leave	quickly	to	
attend	to	other	commitments.	As	a	result	of	these	factors,	high	levels	of	medicines	management	errors	and	near	misses,	due	
to	incorrect	transcriptions,	were	a	long-standing	issue	at	the	hospice.	An	Ishikawa	diagram	(Figure	2)	summarises	the	factors	
that	contributed	to	the	errors.	
A	newly	promoted	manager	decided	to	introduce	a	different	process	to	try	to	address	the	transcribing	problems.	Patients	
were	admitted	as	usual,	but	transcriptions	were	assigned	to	two	RNs	who	were	not	involved	in	admissions,	and	were	located	
in	a	separate	room	to	avoid	interruptions.	As	one	RN	completed	a	transcription,	the	other	checked	it.	Following	
implementation	of	the	new	system	there	were	no	drug	errors	or	near	misses	which	could	be	attributed	to	transcription	
mistakes,	and	it	was	therefore	regarded	as	a	success.		
However,	after	the	new	system	was	implemented	several	healthcare	support	workers	raised	concerns	that	fewer	RNs	were	
available	on	admission	days	to	provide	advice	or	assistance.	These	concerns	were	initially	dismissed	because	of	the	
effectiveness	of	the	new	transcribing	system	in	ensuring	patient	safety.	However,	an	increased	incidence	of	non-medicine	
related	adverse	events	on	admission	days	were	noted	over	time.	Some	were	errors	or	omissions,	others	were	episodes	of	
suboptimal	care	due	to	lack	of	staff,	for	example	a	child	who	required	two	staff	to	assist	with	bathing	or	changing	waiting	a	
long	time,	sometimes	in	soiled	clothing.		
The	rest	of	this	article	critically	explores	the	case	study	to	try	to	understand,	and	address,	the	complexities	of	changing	
nursing	practice,	and	to	illustrate	how	successful	changes	in	one	area	can	result	in	unintended	difficulties	elsewhere	in	an	
organisation.	
Figure	2.	Ishikawa	diagram	of	transcribing	errors	-	manager’s	perspective	
Transcribing	
The	Nursing	and	Midwifery	Council	(NMC)	Standards	for	Medicines	Management	(2010)	define	transcription	as	
‘Any	act	by	which	medicinal	products	are	written	from	one	form	of	direction	to	administer	to	another…’,	while	
transcription	errors	are	‘any	deviation	from	the	initial	prescription	or	medication	order’	(Slight	et	al	2014).	Although	
the	NMC	(2010)	states	that	transcribing	should	only	occur	in	exceptional	circumstances,	it	also	recognises	that	it	
happens	routinely	in	children’s	hospices,	and	directs	registrants	to	Health	Care	Commission	(HCC)	guidance.	
However,	when	the	HCC	was	subsumed	by	the	Care	Quality	Commission	(CQC),	the	guidance	was	archived	and	is	
difficult	to	locate,	illustrated	by	Freedom	of	Information	request	number	0562	(CQC	2013),	so	essentially	there	is	no	
readily	accessible	guidance	from	this	source.		
Transcribing	in	children’s	hospices	is	recognised	as	problematic,	and	the	National	Institute	for	Health	and	Care	
Excellence	(NICE)	is	extending	its	guidance	on	medicines	management	in	care	homes,	the	category	under	which	
children’s	hospices	sit	(NICE	2014a),	through	a	parent-held	medicines	record	for	children	with	complex	conditions	
(NICE	2014b).	This	document	will	provide	the	information	necessary	for	transcription	as	medication	labels,	which	
are	the	usual	source	of	transcription	information,	are	easily	damaged	and	may	be	outdated	(Together	for	Short	Lives	
(TfSL)	2014).		
In	the	future,	an	electronic	system,	where	barcodes	on	medication	packets	and	bottles	are	scanned	and	printed	
onto	drug	charts,	might	be	possible.	This	technology	can	eliminate	transcription	errors	(Poon	et	al	2010),	but	is	
available	mainly	in	the	US	(Burnham	2012).	However,	scanning	barcodes	does	not	rule	out	community	pharmacy	
transcription	errors,	known	as	transposing	(NMC	2010),	which	is	the	most	common	reason	for	dispensing	errors	
(Knudsen	et	al	2007).		
Transcription	as	a	complex	quality	and	safety	issue	
Transcription	is	not	a	routine	activity	in	hospitals,	therefore	transcription	errors	are	not	regarded	as	a	major	cause	
of	preventable	adverse	drug	events	(van	Doormaal	et	al	2009).	However,	this	does	not	apply	to	children’s	hospices	
(TfSL	2014),	which	are	increasing	in	the	UK	and	worldwide	(Boucher	2012).	Transcribing	is	the	‘norm’	rather	than	
the	exception	in	children’s	hospices,	and	can	be	more	chaotic	and	vulnerable	to	error	than	in	other	clinical	areas,	due	
to	the	unique	philosophy	of	care.	For	example,	the	underpinning	philosophy	of	children’s	hospices	is	to	be	‘homely’	
and	welcoming	spaces,	so	most	areas	are	accessible,	and	simultaneously	populated	by	staff,	parents,	grandparents,	
children,	siblings	and	visitors.		
At	the	children’s	hospice	in	the	case	study,	admissions	take	place	in	the	communal	dining	area.	This	area	is	
frequented	by	several	family	members	and	staff	during	mealtimes,	which	often	overlap	with	admission	times,	and	is	
used	for	play	activities,	and	is	the	thoroughfare	between	the	bedrooms	and	reception.	Therefore,	interruptions	were	
frequent	which	resulted	in	transcription	errors.		
The	Swiss	Cheese	model	(Reason	1990,	2010)	is	useful	for	illustrating	how	transcription	errors	led	to	medicines	
management	errors	in	the	original	system	(Figure	3),	and	how	the	new	system	prevented	them	(Figure	4).		
The	model	shows	how	countermeasures	can	‘defend’	against	human	factors.	Errors	occur	when	circumstances	
cause	the	holes	in	the	slices	of	cheese	(defences)	to	align,	and	are	prevented	when	systems	designed	to	defend	against	
safety	hazards	work	correctly,	making	the	line	of	defence	impenetrable.		
However,	the	model	also	illustrates	the	conflict	between	maintaining	certain	aspects	of	quality,	and	upholding	
safety	(Vincent	2010.	In	this	instance,	the	quality	of	patients’	experiences,	that	is	a	‘homely’	and	‘patient-centred’	
environment,	was	maintained	initially,	to	the	unintentional	detriment	of	other	quality	indicators,	such	as	efficient,	
timely	and	safe	transcriptions.	In	other	words,	the	attempt	to	increase	safety	through	partially	restricting	the	
movement	of,	and	interaction	between,	patients	and	their	families	during	transcribing	could	be	interpreted	as	
diminishing	patient-	and	family-centred	care.	
The	case	study	demonstrates	how	an	understanding	of	complexity,	and	complex	systems,	can	benefit	those	who	
are	managing	relatively	small	changes	in	nursing	practice.	Planning	change,	while	considering	some	simple	rules	
from	systems	thinking,	can	help	avoid	the	situation	described,	where	a	positive	change	in	one	area	of	practice	can	be	
offset	by	less	positive	changes	in	another.	
Figure	3.	How	transcription	errors	led	to	medicines	management	errors	in	the	original	system	
Figure	4.	How	the	new	system	of	transcribing	prevented	errors	
Systems	thinking,	unintended	consequences,	and	balancing	measures	
Systems	thinking	is	used	as	a	way	of	understanding	behaviours	and	actions	in	complex	healthcare	organisations	
(Health	Foundation	2010),	and	is	regarded	by	some	authors	as	the	preferred	approach	to	managing	resources	(Adam	
2014,	Peters	2014,	Russell	et	al	2014).	An	important	premise	of	systems	thinking	is	that	every	action	within	a	system	
causes	a	reaction	elsewhere	in	the	system	(Iles	and	Sutherland	2001).	As	illustrated	by	the	case	study,	these	reactions	
can	lead	to	unintended	consequences,	which	can	happen	sometime	after	the	original	action	(Senge	1990)	and	are	
therefore	not	always	attributed	to	them	(Goodwin	et	al	2006).		
The	concept	of	unintended	consequences	has	long	been	discussed	in	social	sciences,	and	is	often	used	to	
understand	and	plan	change	in	complex	organisations.	Defined	as	outcomes	that	are	not	the	ones	that	are	foreseen	
and	intended	by	a	powerful	action	(Merton	1936),	unintended	consequences	can	be	categorised	as	resulting	in	
unexpected	benefits,	or	in	unexpected	drawbacks.	In	the	case	study,	the	unintended	consequences	were	drawbacks,	
as	resourcing	decisions	about	RN	allocation	had	negative	knock-on	effects	elsewhere	in	the	system.	
Improvement	science	has	identified	the	need	to	capture	such	unintended	consequences.	For	example,	the	King’s	
Fund	(Ham	et	al	2016)	suggests	improvement	projects	should	not	only	focus	on	measuring	direct	outcomes	of	
improvement	ideas,	in	this	case	reduction	of	transcription	errors,	but	also	on	‘balancing	measures’,	which	consider	
the	effects	of	improvements	elsewhere	in	the	wider	system.	Consideration	of	the	broader	effects	of	redistributing	RNs	
on	admission/discharge	days	might	have	identified	the	negative	effects	of	work	left	undone	because	of	nurse	
shortages	in	certain	areas.		
Critically	analysing	the	change:	the	case	for	‘wicked	issues’	and	‘system	archetypes’	
All	systems	are	interrelated,	therefore	even	strategies	put	in	place	to	counteract	anticipated	consequences	can	
cause	their	own	effects.	For	example,	if	the	manager	had	anticipated	the	consequences	of	removing	staff	from	the	
unit,	and	counteracted	this	by	rostering	additional	staff,	it	might	have	affected	the	number	of	nurses	available	to	work	
other	shifts.		
The	concept	of	‘wicked	problems’	has	recently	emerged	in	social	sciences	as	a	way	of	explaining	the	intractable	
nature	of	certain	problematic	issues	in	complex	systems.	First	identified	by	Rittel	and	Weber	(1973),	the	concept	
suggests	that	some	problems	evade	simple	understanding	and	solutions,	unlike	‘tame	problems’	that	often	have	clear	
cause-effect	relationships,	and	are	readily	solvable.	Therefore,	when	a	proposed	solution	to	a	wicked	problem	is	
implemented	it	might	resolve	some	aspects,	but	other,	previously	unidentified,	problems	can	then	emerge	that	
require	further	resolution.		
Looked	at	in	this	way,	wicked	problems	can	never	be	completely	solvable.	Instead	solutions	can	only	be	seen	to	
make	things	better	or	worse,	or	sometimes	better	and	worse	at	the	same	time.	The	effect	of	presenting	‘tame	
solutions’	to	wicked	problems	is	illustrated	in	the	case	study,	where	initial	success	was	undermined,	at	a	later	stage,	
by	emergent,	related	problems	elsewhere	in	the	system.	
Another	concept	that	offers	a	useful	critical	lens	through	which	to	analyse	change	and	unintended	consequences	is	
‘system	archetypes’	(Senge	1990),	highly	effective	tools	for	gaining	insight	into	patterns	of	behaviour,	and	which	
reflect	the	underlying	structures	of	the	system	studied.	Archetypes	can	be	useful	for	planning	change,	and	for	
answering	questions	about	organisational	safety	culture,	by	helping	to	clarify	why	safety-related	decisions	do	not	
always	result	in	the	desired	behaviours,	and	how	undesired	side	effects	arise	from	apparently	good	decisions	(Marais	
et	al	2006).	One	particular	archetype,	‘fixing	symptoms	rather	than	root	causes’,	is	described	below.		
A	‘fix’	is	implemented	in	response	to	a	safety	problem,	temporarily	reducing	the	problem’s	symptoms.	However,	
the	fix	does	not	eliminate	the	deeper	structural	deficiencies,	or	the	root	cause	of	the	problem,	that	led	to	the	incident	
in	the	first	place	and	may	lead	to	other	incidents	in	the	future.	Additionally,	solutions	that	only	address	the	
symptoms,	rather	than	causes,	of	problems	might,	in	the	short	to	medium	term,	create	the	illusion	that	there	is	no	
problem,	which	will	diminish	the	overall	safety	of	an	organisation.	Eliminating	root	causes	is	likely	to	be	more	time-
consuming,	expensive	and	difficult	to	implement	than	applying	symptomatic	solutions	(Marais	et	al	2006).	
Addressing	root	causes		
Having	recently	been	promoted,	the	manager	in	the	case	study	might	have	focused	on	day-to-day	events	rather	
than	taking	a	more	strategic	perspective,	which	has,	historically,	been	nurses’	approach	to	patient	safety	initiatives	
(Mitchell	2008).	The	manager	drew	on	the	resources	available	to	her	to	manage	the	symptoms	of	the	problem,	but	
could	not	influence	overall	staffing	levels	directly,	which	was	an	important	root	cause.	Another	root	cause,	the	
complex,	error-inducing	admissions	logistics,	could	have	been	addressed	without	financial	consequences,	but	would	
have	required	approval	to	change	operational	policies	and	procedures,	and	possibly	a	perceived	shift	away	from	the	
hospice’s	patient-centred	values.		
One	of	the	most	obvious	strategies	is	to	prevent	overlaps	by	enforcing	discharge	and	admission	times.	However,	
the	demands	of	caring	for	children	with	complex	needs,	and	other	family	commitments,	means	that	adhering	to	strict	
timetables	is	difficult	for	parents.	Further,	admonishing	families	for	not	adhering	to	timelines	is	contrary	to	the	
hospice’s	philosophy,	and	seems	petty	in	the	circumstances.	This	is	another	example	of	where	quality	(of	experience)	
and	safety	are	not	interwoven	(Vincent	2010),	as	one	directly	compromises,	rather	than	improves,	the	other.		
At	present,	the	manager	is	restricted	by	the	long-standing	pattern	of	admissions	on	Mondays	and	Fridays,	which	
was	established	when	the	hospice	first	opened	on	a	Monday	to	Friday.	When	provision	was	extended	to	seven	days,	
weekend	stays	(Friday	till	Monday)	were	added	to	the	pattern	of	Monday-to-Friday	stays.	Despite	the	pressure	this	
puts	on	staffing,	bedroom	turnaround	and	management	of	complicated	admissions,	the	pattern	remains	unchanged.		
There	are	feasible	solutions,	for	example	spreading	admissions	and	discharges	over	seven	days,	or	discharging	in	
the	late	afternoon/early	evening,	and	admitting	early	to	mid-morning,	would	eliminate	overlap.	However,	since	
families	are	allocated	short	breaks	at	least	six	months	in	advance,	implementation	of	staggered	admissions	would	
need	to	be	incremental.	This	change	would	need	to	be	piloted,	followed	by	consultation	with	staff,	children	and	their	
families,	before	deciding	on	a	final	strategy,	which	would	also	require	review.	One	potential	problem	is	managing	
families’	expectations,	as	they	are	accustomed	to	the	present	system,	therefore	a	period	of	normalisation	would	be	
required	(May	2013),	during	which	the	new	system	would	be	formalised	by	policy,	and	monitored	by	audit.	
Summary	and	recommendations	
The	application	of	systems	thinking	(Senge	1990)	to	a	medicines	management	scenario	illustrates	how	quality	
improvement	practitioners	can	use	the	approach	to	underpin	planning	and	implementation	of	patient	safety	
initiatives.	Although	the	scenario	is	specific	to	transcribing	in	children’s	hospices,	the	strategies	can	be	applied	to	
other	areas.		
The	discussion	illustrates	that	while	tools	such	as	the	Swiss	Cheese	(Reason	1990,	2010)	and	Ishikawa	(1990)	
diagrams	are	useful	for	identifying	the	cause	of	problems,	and	generating	possible	solutions,	they	need	to	be	
considered	carefully	in	terms	of	unintended	consequences,	and	how	the	system	in	which	the	solution	is	implemented	
might	be	affected	by	the	change.		
Further,	staff	leading	on	quality	improvement	projects	must	be	mindful	that	‘fixing’	symptoms	does	not	address	
root	causes,	and	that	improvement	projects	can	overlook,	or	not	attempt	to	address,	root	causes	beyond	their	sphere	
of	influence.	Analysis	of	problems	using	systems	thinking	is	a	helpful	way	of	developing	robust	and	well-informed	
business	cases	to	present	to	those	who	make	decisions	about	financial	investments	or	policy	changes.		
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Place Procedure
Noisy
Unsuitable location for work, 
such as a dining room
Location is a thoroughfare
Pressure caused by parents’ need  
or desire to expedite departure
Staf interrupting colleagues  
to ask questions or for assistance
Human error
People Policies
Patients admitted arrive  
early; patients discharged 
leave late
Should be carried out  
on day of admission
Transcription errors
Information gathered from 
bottles or packets
Information handwritten  
on drug chart
Admissions and 
discharges planned 
on only two days
Admissions and 
discharges occur 
on same day
Admissions and 
discharges occur 
almost concurrently
Distractions by family members, such as parents 
chatting or siblings becoming fractious
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Hazard
Harm
A. Volume of admissions
B. Noisy environment
C.  Inaccurate 
transcription 
check
D.  Inaccurate 
premedication 
administration 
check
Active failures
Latent conditions
Latent conditions remain so failures still 
possible should they come into play
Hazard
No harm
A. Volume of admissions
B. Quiet environment
C.  Transcription cross-checked  
by a designated individual
D.  Accurate premedication 
administration check
Error trajectory 
stopped
Barriers
